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This article considers lessons learned from conducting research inside the 
intelligence community. Drawing on a year of ethnographic field work and 
interviews at the National Counterterrorism Center, I show that “boundary 
personnel”- people who navigate between the worlds of academia and 
national security - provide value added in the form of tacit knowledge that 
outside researchers would not be able to deliver. At the same time, these 
people face delays, challenges to freedom of information, and ethical 
considerations that are unique to their positions. Despite setbacks, social 
scientists must continue their engagement with national security 
organizations to further our understanding of how these powerful institutions
operate.
Keywords
Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, counterterrorism, ethnography, 
Intelligence Community, National Counterterrorism Center, NCTC, 
organizational culture, sociology, tacit knowledge
The relationship between science and the government has historically 
been fraught. Scholars have shown that the boundary between the two 
domains is not static but rather dynamic and flexible, drawn and redrawn in 
historically contingent and sometimes ambiguous ways (Gieryn 1983; 
Dennis 1999; Berling and Bueger 2013; Wellerstein 2008). Research on 
scientists in STEM fields pays particular attention to the difficulty of 
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negotiating the tension between academic freedom and national security 
interests. For instance, Evans and Valdivia (2012) discuss the U.S. 
government’s intervention in scientists’ publication of the methods used to 
replicate the H5N1 bird flu virus over bioterrorism concerns; Russell and 
Webster (2005) discuss a similar controversy over the genetic sequencing of
the 1918 flu virus. Others show that the development and deployment of 
powerful weapons over the last century centralized science and technology 
as security concerns for the U.S. government (e.g., Vogel, Balmer, Evans, 
Kroener, Matsumoto, and Rappert 2017; Bussolini 2011). Nuclear weapons 
in particular have been a consistent focal point, as have the social 
organization of their development at Los Alamos National Laboratory and 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (e.g., Gusterson 1996; Rhodes 
1986; Teller 1993; Bussolini 2011; Masco 2006). 
The emphasis in this literature is understandably on natural sciences, 
math, and engineering, so for the most part it overlooks how social scientists
negotiate similar tensions when working on issues related to national 
security, intelligence, and the military. In addition, research exploring the 
relationship between science and the government focuses almost exclusively
on scientists who do research for the U.S. government, rather than those 
who do research on it. Finally, the contested material in this research is 
information, not personnel: scientists and government officials, often seeing 
themselves as occupying separate spheres, negotiate a blurry space in which
2
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both entities lay claim to some scientific finding, method, or product. The 
social positions of the people themselves are not contested in the literature; 
the spheres seem to blur when committees are formed to negotiate 
acceptable information use (Evans and Valdivia 2012), but there is no 
discussion of the ways in which individual researchers may navigate both 
spaces. This article looks at the challenges and opportunities presented 
when social scientists themselves blur the boundary between government 
work and academia. How does their negotiation of this interstitial space 
affect the research process? What kinds of insights can the security 
clearance yield for an academic researcher, and - perhaps more importantly 
- what are its limitations? How might these accesses shape social scientists, 
and what are the longer-term implications for scholarship as a result of their 
experiences inside the intelligence community? Finally, what can research 
inside the U.S. intelligence community teach us about its people, analytic 
practices, and organizational culture that social scientists would not be able 
to learn from the outside?1
1 Methods: Ethnography is the descriptive documentation of a living culture. It usually 
combines a number of approaches, such as participant-observation, interview, and 
artifact analysis, to present a detailed picture of the culture of interest. It is generally 
qualitative and designed to present the view of the study subjects as understood from 
the researcher’s own perspective. Ethnographic methods originally emerged in 
anthropology, but have since been adopted by other social sciences, including sociology. 
The classical view is that ethnography requires the researcher to spend significant time 
(years, ideally) living among the people they are studying, but sociologists have had 
success in using ethnography to study cultures in work places, schools, or other 
organizational locations without actually living with the people they are studying. My 
research fits into this latter application of ethnographic methods. I worked as a 
counterterrorism analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) between 2007 and 
2011. During my time there, I sought and received permission to conduct an 
ethnography of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which is the organization 
that was created after 9/11 to address the 9/11 Commission Report’s finding that 
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Tacit Knowledge
In thinking of the ways in which people may blur the space between 
academia and security organizations, it is useful to deploy the concept of 
boundary objects, “those objects that both inhabit several communities of 
practice and satisfy the informational requirements of each” (Bowker and 
Starr 1999, 297). What we might call “boundary personnel” instead of 
“boundary objects” have similar features. I argue that social scientists 
wishing to study how the intelligence community (IC) works cannot get a 
comprehensive picture of what the organizations are like without spending 
intelligence agencies were not sharing information the way they could or should. NCTC 
was created to house officers from all around the IC under one roof, with the hopes that 
working alongside representatives from other agencies would encourage analysts to 
share information. During the course of my research, I wanted to explore whether and 
how that information sharing occurs. As a sociologist, I was interested in learning about 
the small, day-to-day interactions that comprise the life of the analyst, as well as the 
larger organizational dynamics that accomplish intelligence work. I conducted 20 in-
depth interviews between August and December of 2010. I knew most of the participants
personally, but a few people I did not know got in touch with me after hearing about my 
study and asked to participate. I aimed to get a relatively diverse sample with regard to 
the analysts’ home agencies, to get as many perspectives as possible. Official 
demographic information was not available, but my perception is that the population of 
analysts in the wider IC is not particularly diverse on measures of race, gender, and age, 
so there is some, but not much, variation on these measures in my interview sample. 
The average age of the interview participants was 31.8 years, with a range of 24 to 47 
and a median of 31.5. All but three of the participants identified as white; 13 identified as
female and 7 as male. The average amount of time served at NCTC was 2.48 years, with 
a range of four months to six years, and a median of two years. The average amount of 
time served in the federal government was 7.7 years, with a range of 2 to 15 years, and 
a median of 7.5 years. Thirteen of the participants had at least one graduate-level 
degree, usually a master’s degree. Thirteen of the participants claimed CIA as their home
organization; seven of the longer-serving participants claimed more than one home 
organization over the course of their careers. Drawing from my observations and 
experiences, my sample reflects the analyst population writ large, with the possible 
exception of the gender breakdown. (My sense was that most analysts were male, but 
again I cannot be sure, because official demographics are not available; in any case, 
there is still very much an “old boys’ club” feel to both CIA and NCTC, which analysts 
reported and with which my own experience was commensurate [e.g., Jones 2016].) 
4
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 5
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/5
time as a practitioner. The primary reason for this is that intelligence work 
relies heavily on tacit knowledge - knowledge that, contrary to explicit 
knowledge, cannot be and/or has not been effectively stored or transferred 
by impersonal means such as verbal or written instructions (MacKenzie and 
Spinardi 1995).
The prevalence of tacit knowledge in professions is not new or unique 
to intelligence work - it is an important reason why many occupations have 
historically relied on the apprenticeship model - but the combination of the 
primacy of tacit knowledge with the secrecy that shrouds the IC means that 
spending time as a practitioner is absolutely crucial for understanding this 
work. Boundary personnel are especially important for this research because
tacit knowledge is embodied (MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995). Even in 
security areas that may at first seem to rely more heavily on explicit 
knowledge - MacKenzie and Spinari (1995), for instance, focus on the 
production and reproduction of nuclear weapons - tacit knowledge proves so 
important that its absence would result in the “uninvention” of the weapons 
entirely, even in the presence of explicit knowledge in the form of lab 
notebooks, computer programs, and general physics expertise. For 
intelligence practitioners, tacit knowledge often takes the form of 
“judgment”: a sense, accumulated in the body over some period of time of 
having done the job, of what works and what doesn’t, of what seems right 
and what feels wrong. Of course, some of what the CIA does has a hard-
5
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science component, but much of the subject matter policymakers want to 
know about requires even more reliance on tacit knowledge because of the 
challenges, gaps, and uncertainties involved in collecting and analyzing 
intelligence.
The sense of judgment conferred by the accumulation of tacit 
knowledge takes time to develop. As a result, practitioners speak of a “long 
learning curve” (MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995, 62); with regard to nuclear 
weapons development, even designers with relevant physics backgrounds 
take “five years to become useful.” My own experience is commensurate; in 
my dissertation, I wrote the following about my first impressions inside the 
CIA:
The learning curve was unbelievably steep, not only in the methods of 
doing the job but also the ways in which people exchanged mere 
pleasantries. I frequently found myself understanding the words, but 
not the meaning, of what people said to me, which created a profound 
sense of culture shock and made the adjustment incredibly difficult. 
This shock was exacerbated by the secrecy in which the job is 
engulfed; there is no real way to prepare oneself for the first days and 
weeks of this job. It was as though a curtain were lifted, and all of the 
people, places, and things behind it came hurtling at me all at once 
with the force of water from a fire hose. (Nolan 2013, 3)
I was explicitly told in my first weeks inside the IC that I should not 
expect to get anything done (in the form of publishing classified papers) for 
at least the first few months, maybe even a year. It can take up to six 
months to be granted access to some classified systems, and accumulating 
the tacit knowledge required not only to do quality intelligence analysis but 
also to navigate routine daily situations simply must be acquired the hard 
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way. Many of my colleagues pointed to the organization’s reliance on tacit 
knowledge as one of their greatest sources of overwhelm and frustration. 
They reported, and my own experience confirmed, that tacit knowledge 
ranged from relatively small matters, such as figuring out the correct form to
complete, to larger matters, such as knowledge of one’s own job description 
or the goals of the larger organization. Part of this confusion at the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) stems from the fact that as a fledgling 
organization, NCTC’s predecessor simply adopted many of CIA’s bureaucratic
procedures. This is confusing for non-CIA personnel at NCTC, but it is also 
confusing for CIA employees, because it is often unclear which organization 
is supposed to take responsibility for an action. Some analysts told me that 
they felt the management sometimes used this lack of clarity between 
agencies as an excuse not to fund training opportunities or travel expenses. 
A few excerpts illustrate this idea:
CIA analyst: If there is [frustration at work], it’s usually figuring out 
how you’re supposed to do something, what the proper procedure is. 
It’s hard to figure out if it’s not written down anywhere. Like travel. 
The simplest thing like buying a plane ticket is so not intuitive, and 
you often don’t even know to ask. (Nolan 2013, 34)
CIA analyst relatively new to the IC: This place is just so weird, 
because the people here seem to assume things that are not at all 
intuitive, and then they get mad when you haven’t come to those 
conclusions yourself. Like, when I first started here, they were doing 
some construction and there were fewer parking spaces, so they 
instituted this valet parking system. But it wasn’t like a valet in the 
real world where you pull up and hand the attendant the key or 
whatever. You were supposed to just know that you had to leave your 
car key on the left rear tire, in case the valet had to move your car. 
Even on your first day without having met anyone you were somehow 
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supposed to know this. Well, I’d been working there for months and I 
didn’t know it. Why would you assume something like that? How does 
that make intuitive sense? So I took my keys with me, and it turns out
I was blocking in one of the higher-ups who needed to get out to go to
a briefing, and they sent this system-wide flash alert to everyone’s 
computer screen about my car, and it was just so embarrassing, but 
like, how was I supposed to know? And how was I supposed to know 
that I didn’t even know how to park my car? Stuff like that makes you 
start second-guessing everything you took for granted before. (Nolan 
2013, 34)
Several analysts I talked to (and my own experience) corroborated 
this idea of not only not knowing something, but not even knowing what to 
know or what to ask, which contributed to this overall feeling of chaos. In a 
larger, more general sense, many of my colleagues told me that they often 
were not really sure what their jobs were, and they felt that they had very 
little understanding of what other people in the organization do, even those 
in the same analytic group:
CIA analyst: NCTC is really focused on getting tools and training its 
people but—there’s all this talk about loose threads, like the Pursuit 
cell [the group created after the 2009 failed Christmas Day bombing to
follow so-called “loose threads”], and I don’t really know what that 
means. I don’t even know what I’m doing on a day to day basis. We’re
fighting the War on Terror. What does that actually mean? How do you
specifically go about that day to day? Like, when we were fighting the 
Cold War, we were more sure then, I think. There was a country that 
we could point to and we knew we were fighting. Now it’s like, 
networks, there don’t seem to be countries anymore with this, and it’s 
really hard to know what winning this war would look like. (Nolan 
2013, 35)
CIA analyst: Over the time that I worked in the IC, I was always 
amazed at how little people knew about other people’s jobs. … You’ve 
been there three and a half years, and you’re telling me that you don’t
know anything outside of REM [analytic group]. I don’t know anything 
about REM. And we’re just within one area. Within LX [the Liberty 
Crossing building, where NCTC is located], there are floors dedicated 
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to the FBI or the CIA. Do you know who even works there? Have you 
ever been there? It’s not like HQ where there are areas you can’t get 
into. But LX isn’t like that. So I mean, LX is like Spaceballs. Do you 
know the scene I’m talking about? It’s like the captain of the ship, and 
he’s talking to the guy on the screen, and he’s like, WTF, we can’t hear
you, and it’s like, they just come around to the other side of the 
screen. It’s like a SVTC [secure video teleconference], you realize half 
the people in the SVTC are actually in the building and we’re wasting 
15 minutes trying to get the damn thing to work. I wouldn’t be 
derogatory toward NCTC though. I would think about it as like, the 
incredible challenges that NCTC has to navigate in order to integrate 
the way it wants to, with something that’s fundamentally designed not 
to be integrated. (Nolan 2013, 35)
This phenomenon is not uncommon in large organizations; Vaughan 
(1996, 250) states that as organizations grow, the actions of the people that
comprise them become less easily observable. Vaughan also says that 
secrecy is a fundamental feature of any organization, not just organizations 
like the CIA that specifically require secrecy to protect sources and methods.
Increased hierarchy, bureaucratization, and specialized knowledge create 
social distance among employees, making it difficult to understand fully what
another part of the organization does, and so this finding may not seem 
remarkable in a government organization like NCTC. But the added 
dimension of secrecy as a specific function of the organization adds 
complexity to these issues, and as Vogel et al. (2017) remind us, the unique
operation of secrecy in security organizations, as opposed to private life or 
the commercial sector, means these organizations are worthy of special 
consideration.
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These examples barely scratch the surface of the many ways in which 
intelligence work relies on tacit knowledge. Creating written products - the 
primary task for intelligence analysts - is frequently described as an “art,” 
which connotes the importance of subjective judgment and creativity (e.g., 
Hasler 2010; Crumpton 2013). Even more often, intelligence work is 
characterized as “tradecraft,” a “catchall for the often-idiosyncratic methods 
and techniques required to perform [intelligence] analysis,” defined as 
“practiced skill in a trade or art” that “purposefully implies a mysterious 
process learned only by the initiated and acquired only through the elaborate
rituals of professional indoctrination” (Johnston 2005, 17-18). Echoing 
MacKenzie and Spinardi’s (1995) finding that judgment is a collective 
phenomenon rather than an individual one, analytic papers in the IC are 
considered “community” products; the paper does not bear the name of the 
individual author, but rather the seal of the institution for which the author 
works. The CIA at least recognizes that tacit knowledge is embodied; some 
CIA-sponsored documents explicitly talk about the loss of institutional 
memory due to attrition (e.g., Johnston 2005), and during my time there, 
people in positions of power talked about the need to preserve this kind of 
embodied information by strengthening mentoring programs and generating 
“lessons learned”-type documents.
All of this speaks to the benefits - indeed, the necessity - of having an 
intelligence practitioner with the proper academic training conduct research 
10
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on the intelligence community. Depending on their research questions, 
academics with no personal experience on the “inside” may find their lack of 
access to be an insurmountable challenge; the practitioner’s embodied sense
of the profession is thus the greatest opportunity afforded by their access.
Socialization and the Security Clearance
“Insider” status presents challenges in addition to its opportunities. 
Getting a security clearance to work at the CIA is a long, arduous, 
sometimes-harrowing process that requires the applicant to open their lives 
entirely to a faceless bureaucracy with no guaranteed payoff. I was required 
to have a background check, during which the government talked to family 
members, close friends, and neighbors about my personal character and 
lifestyle. I submitted to days of physical and psychological testing, including 
an eight-hour polygraph exam. I did all of this voluntarily, but with no idea 
of what kinds of information was waiting for me once I had a Top Secret 
clearance. There is, by definition, no way to know until you know. This 
access unquestionably shaped me as a person and as a social scientist; I 
distinctly recall a colleague’s comments in my first weeks at the Agency that 
they could tell by the look on my face that I had been “read in”—that is, that
I had learned Top Secret information. I related to Masco’s (2010: 441) 
discussion of secrecy’s “distorting effects”  and Daniel Ellsberg’s (2002) 
reflections on the psychological effects of access to classified information in 
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his autobiography. That access has static and dynamic elements; once you 
know something, you know it, but the maintenance of that information 
requires obfuscation, occasional lying, and many kinds of keeping track, all 
of which is invisible labor that takes a toll.
Moreover, the onboarding processes for intelligence practitioners vary 
by agency. My research shows that there is a persistent status hierarchy 
among the intelligence agencies and that the CIA is at the top of that 
hierarchy, even after the post-9/11 restructuring of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community. It is therefore impossible to present oneself as both an insider 
and as a neutral researcher. As a researcher, I had the bias-mitigating 
advantage of not having physically worked at CIA Headquarters for very long
before I started working at the National Counterterrorism Center, but I was 
still a CIA person, and was viewed and treated as such during my time in the
IC. I therefore tried as much as possible to foreground the experiences and 
stories of others, and included my own only when they were also 
corroborated by my colleagues.
Still, insiders conducting any kind of fieldwork must guard against 
what is sometimes called “going native” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, 
110) in social science research and “clientism” in the intelligence community 
(Lowenthal 2014, 163): the tendency to become so immersed in the target 
population that the researcher defends or apologizes for that population 
instead of analyzing it more objectively. All ethnographers must prioritize 
12
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the protection of their subjects’ identities, but research inside the IC ups the 
ante on this. Vogel et al. (2017) highlight this challenge, suggesting that 
concerns about protecting information and the identities of colleagues inside 
the IC may result in the researcher’s actively and selectively deleting 
important details from the story they tell. Given that writing an ethnography 
is already a process that shapes rather than reflects the population of 
interest (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995), the added security concerns 
surrounding identity protection constitute a further challenge to the research
process. I certainly made these kinds of choices, both consciously and—I am
sure—unconsciously. There were many incredibly rich details and 
interactions that I could not document because of the highly sensitive 
circumstances in which they occurred, and there were times when I probably
could have written about certain situations but chose not to in order to 
protect my colleagues. I felt that these choices were necessary for me to 
uphold both my oath of office and the ethics of field work, but I am 
cognizant that these choices also necessarily affect both the research 
process and the final product.
Ethical Concerns
Among the social sciences, anthropology has the longest and most 
complicated history with the U.S. military and intelligence services. The U.S. 
government has employed anthropologists ostensibly in pursuit of 
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“sociocultural expertise” (Kusiak 2008), but controversy over its deployment 
in programs such as the Human Terrain System and abuses during the Cold 
War, coupled with the discipline’s colonialist history, have led to calls within 
the field to examine its relationship with the U.S. government (American 
Anthropological Association 2007). These concerns over “weaponizing 
anthropology” (Price 2011) have resulted in recommendations from the 
American Anthropological Association to revise its Code of Ethics to achieve 
more granularity on issues of secrecy as a condition for funding, informed 
consent, and “politically distasteful” vs. “ethically problematic” activities 
(American Anthropological Association 2007, 25). The report does make 
distinctions among types of research projects, noting that policy work and 
organizational studies are less ethically risky than operational roles in which 
anthropologists are asked to provide front-line expertise to support military 
commanders in the field (American Anthropological Association 2007, 12-
13). These recommendations underscore the key difference in conducting 
research for the U.S. military and intelligence services rather than on them 
(American Anthropological Association 2007, 16).
Rob Johnston’s (2005) work on CIA analytic culture is the best 
example of anthropological research on the U.S. intelligence community. 
Johnston himself may be considered “boundary personnel,” since his work is 
available in open sources, and he has worked both in academia and the IC. 
But because his work was sponsored by the CIA - he was hired by the CIA’s 
14
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Center for the Study of Intelligence - this research on the CIA was also for it 
at the same time, which is muddier territory for the AAA’s positions on this 
work. I hasten to add that I do not think Johnston’s work is ethically 
questionable in any way; I merely highlight the difficulty of navigating these 
two spheres for any researcher.
Sociology does not have the same colonial history as anthropology; I 
am also the only sociologist I know of who has attempted ethnographic 
research on the IC, so the ethical challenges I faced are confined to my own 
projects rather than rising to the level of discipline-wide ethical 
contemplation, as anthropology has required. Although my work in many 
ways was a straightforward workplace ethnography, secrecy and security 
concerns created additional dilemmas. For instance, the American 
Sociological Association’s Code of Ethics requires that informed consent be 
obtained from research participants in a process that “involves oral and/or 
written consent” (American Sociological Association 1999, section 12.02). I 
would have preferred to have my interview participants fill out consent forms
on paper, but in order to protect their identities, I sought the blessing of my 
institution’s IRB to obtain verbal consent only. Though the Code clearly 
states that this is permissible, I still had to think through the ethics of less 
record keeping rather than more. I also had to consider the privacy issues—
separate from security issues - that every workplace ethnographer must 
face. Obtaining informed consent from interview subjects is one thing, but 
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what about ordinary interactions among workers in what they rightly assume
is private space? I was able to make the case to my institution’s IRB that my
research met the two criteria for the general informed consent waiver: The 
research involved no more than minimal risk to the participants, and the 
research could not practicably be carried out if general informed consent 
were required (section 12.01). Coupled with the “top cover” of having the 
Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center give me written 
permission to do the project, I satisfied these ethical obligations, but not 
without adding months to my timeline.
These days, the use of recording technology eases many ethnographer
concerns. The use of video/audio recording (with the subjects’ informed 
consent) can allow the researcher to focus more on what is going on in the 
moment without also having to worry about recording. At the CIA and at 
NCTC, though, recording equipment of any kind is prohibited, which meant I 
could not bring in a tape recorder, cell phone, camera, or laptop. This is 
understandable for preventing the disclosure of classified information, but it 
made conducting interviews quite difficult - I had to take handwritten notes, 
and I was only able to get verbatim quotes if the participant was willing to 
wait for me to write more than jottings or repeat what they’d said, which 
often disrupted the flow of the conversation and took up valuable interview 
time. Even when the interviews took place outside of the office, I still did not
want to record my colleagues in the interest of protecting their identities, 
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though being able to use a laptop outside of work did allow the 
conversations to flow a bit better and faster. Although I knew I had no 
choice about recording, I did then have to face ethical dilemmas about how I
wanted to represent my colleagues’ experiences textually. I made careful 
choices about how I was going to use quotation marks to indicate verbatim 
comments when, without a recording, I could never be completely sure they 
were verbatim. Even when I reviewed turns of phrase with my colleagues 
and asked them to confirm that I was representing their words fairly, I 
necessarily lost some of the first-take freshness and spontaneity recordings 
afford. 
None of these dilemmas rise to the level other social scientists have 
faced in their work on and for the IC and the military, but it is important that
each ethical dilemma be taken seriously and navigated successfully in order 
for the work to maintain its integrity.
Longer-Term Issues for Scholarship
There can be no doubt that the primary challenge presented to 
boundary personnel stems from the non-disclosure agreement employees 
with security clearances are required to sign. This contract requires the 
signatory’s surrender of some First Amendment rights. From the moment of 
signing, whether the employee works in national security for a day or for 
thirty years, they must submit all writing related to their job to a board that 
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will review it to determine whether it contains classified information. At the 
CIA, that body is the Publications Review Board (PRB); if other entities, such
as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) have a stake in 
the material, they also weigh in. This requirement extends beyond 
traditional publication outlets such as books or articles to include blog posts, 
opinion pieces, tweets, Facebook posts, resumes, speeches, and more, and 
the material must be cleared before it can be shared with editors, 
colleagues, advisers, friends, or anyone without a clearance for that material
(Central Intelligence Agency 2016). The need to protect against the 
disclosure of classified information is of course undeniable, and signatories 
enter into this contractual obligation freely.
This requirement begins to present challenges to scholarship when 
classification standards become unclear. Information is classified when it is 
determined that its disclosure would cause some degree of damage to 
national security; the difference among Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret 
information is that its disclosure would respectively cause “damage,” 
“serious damage,” and “exceptionally grave damage” to national security 
(The White House Executive 2009). Very little guidance is available to help 
determine the differences among these phrases, which leads to 
overclassification for practitioners (e.g., Ellington 2011) and uncertainty for 
would-be writers and publishers. Materials available in the public domain are
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sometimes redacted anyway (Masco 2010), and approaches to releasing 
classified or sensitive information seem to vary by agency (Masco 2010). 
I argue that information review also varies within agencies. For 
instance, when I revised a chapter of my dissertation, I included a few 
sentences that the PRB had previously approved, but they were returned to 
me this time redacted in the following way:
[CIA applicants] must endure days of physical and psychological 
testing, including a harrowing polygraph examination, during which the
examiner may redacted redacted redacted redacted to the applicant. 
My polygraph lasted redacted hours, and while spending most of that 
time strapped to a tight blood pressure cuff, I redacted redacted 
redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted 
redacted.
I requested clarification of the new redactions, and included the original 
approved manuscript from January 2015 to show where the text had 
previously been cleared. I was told that the redactions were based on 
“current classification guidance,” and that the Board upheld all redactions—
with the exception of the word “eight,” which I was now allowed to print:
[CIA applicants] must endure days of physical and psychological 
testing, including a harrowing polygraph examination, during which the
examiner may redacted redacted redacted redacted to the applicant. 
My polygraph lasted eight hours, and while spending most of that time
strapped to a tight blood pressure cuff, I redacted redacted redacted 
redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted.
In other words, as of January 2015, I was allowed to say that my 
polygraph lasted eight hours (and that version of the manuscript remains on 
the Internet for anyone to see); on November 14, 2017, I was no longer 
allowed to say the word “eight”; and two days later, on November 16, it was
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allowed again. It is difficult to believe that these changes were based more 
on objective “current classification guidelines” - and that those guidelines 
happened to have changed in a two-day period in a way that specifically 
affected my use of the word “eight” - than on the subjective individual 
variation introduced by whomever answers the request for review. Does it 
really matter whether people know my polygraph lasted “hours” or “eight 
hours”? No, but the principle is the point: As we know from Durkheim, the 
organizational approach to managing secrets is often more important than 
the content of those secrets ([1912] 1995). Moreover, the workings of the 
PRB itself are secretive: Despite my efforts to find out, I still do not know 
how many people sit on the PRB nor whether its decisions are reached by 
majority vote or some other procedure. Just as the practice of “science” is 
not static, but rather a dynamic, iterative process (Gieryn 1983), so too is 
the production and reproduction of “classification,” echoing Vogel et al.’s 
(2017) point that knowledge more generally is socially constructed at every 
step along the way.
Other scholars have grappled with similar issues. Aftergood (1999) 
writes about what he calls “genuine national security secrecy”—in other 
words, legitimate secrecy - as opposed to “political secrecy” (secrecy 
maintained for a political advantage) and “bureaucratic secrecy” (20) (the 
Weberian tendency of bureaucracies to control perception of the organization
by restricting information), both of which are illegitimate but nonetheless 
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common practices dating back to World War II; Dempsey (1998) has similar 
qualms. The asymmetrical power relationship between the writer and the 
state further complicate freedom of speech issues, and indeed the 
interactions between the PRB and the writer are sites for the performance 
and reproduction of that asymmetry. Former practitioners-turned-
memoirists perhaps face less career pressure concerning the PRB but are no 
less beholden to - and often no less frustrated by - its caprices (e.g., Plame 
2007; Hayden 2016).
Associating with the IC or the military can also affect the scholar’s self-
concept and their relationship with their discipline. Working for the CIA in 
particular is simultaneously prestigious and stigmatized; the salience of each
quality depends heavily on social context, such that the scholar may 
constantly find themselves navigating which parts of their professional 
experience to highlight and which to downplay. The AAA report on 
anthropological engagement with the security and intelligence communities 
finds that “many” of the anthropologists the committee interviewed felt 
“disconnected” from the Association (American Anthropological Association 
2007, 56). Some had allowed their professional memberships to lapse, 
either because they no longer felt it was relevant to their work or because 
“they felt uncomfortable attending conferences where they would have to 
explain their involvement … to a potentially hostile audience” (American 
Anthropological Association 2007, 56). An academic anthropologist who did 
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contract work for the Department of Defense used the language of “staying 
in the closet” about his involvement, out of fear of losing friends; another 
practitioner was called a “fascist” during a session at the AAA annual 
meeting because of her involvement with the military, and recalled not 
getting much support from the audience in her defense (American 
Anthropological Association 2007, 57). I have not encountered that kind of 
hostility, but I have had people react unfavorably to my affiliation, as when a
potential editor rejected my book proposal on the grounds that “this project 
takes a lot of granted: i.e. that the work of these counter-intelligence agents
should be wholly supported” (personal correspondence, 6/27/14).2 If other 
sociologists take issue with my affiliation, it is most likely to be expressed in 
a way that would make it indistinguishable from the many kinds of rejection 
academics already face in a hyper-competitive field (for instance, having 
articles or grant proposals rejected, or not being invited to interview for a 
job).
The requirement to submit all written work to the PRB also introduces 
a timing issue for scholars. The longer the manuscript and the more entities 
that are involved, the longer this review process can take; one must 
resubmit revisions to the PRB as well, such that the researcher must draft 
the work on their own, obtain PRB approval before sending the manuscript 
to colleagues or editors, then go back for further review with the PRB after 
revisions are complete, then go back for more review if editors or colleagues
2 I choose not to include additional citation information to protect the editor’s identity.
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suggest further revisions. The process of publishing in sociology has already 
come under scrutiny for, among other things, the amount of time it can take
to get through review; the requirement to send all written work to the IC 
every step of the way has the effect of significantly slowing down an 
already-sluggish process. This can leave the researcher in the position of 
having done interesting research, but not having much to show for the 
amount of time that has to pass before it is published - an additional 
pressure in a supremely difficult job market and tenure process. A 
practitioner-academic may have published prolifically in classified journals or
other forums, but if that work must remain classified, their CV may appear 
blank. Gusterson (1999, 58) addresses this problem - the “death of the 
author” - among nuclear scientists working at Livermore Laboratory, but the 
lack of ownership over their government work is an issue with which all 
practitioners must contend if they intend to negotiate that transition 
successfully.
Restrictions on writing for former employees means that boundary 
personnel do not have the same freedoms to respond to critics of their 
writing or comment on current events in a timely manner. These days, it is 
not uncommon for academics to have Twitter accounts or personal websites 
that they use to increase their visibility in their field, but the requirement to 
send all writing to the PRB results in delays that mitigate the effectiveness of
these platforms when used for career-enhancement purposes. 
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Longer-term implications for scholarship also depend upon one’s status
in the IC. If the researcher leaves the IC to pursue academia, they are still 
beholden to the regulations of the review board but may be unable to gain 
further access to the population. Thus, if an editor or reviewer raises an 
issue that would be best addressed with further inquiry—follow-up interviews
or more observations—the researcher is likely unable to fulfill this request. If
the researcher has remained inside the IC to allow for continued access, 
they are subject to additional standards of review that may make getting 
manuscripts out even more difficult than it already is. Although a former 
employee’s writings can only be rejected if the manuscript contains classified
information, current employees face additional standards, such as whether 
the research interferes with the employee’s job duties or with U.S. national 
security interests. 
Staying on the inside also means the researcher must continue to deal 
with the labyrinthine bureaucracy that comprises the U.S. government. On 
top of the standard delays and inefficiencies, the researcher may be met 
with resistance from unknown bureaucrats who are not even involved in the 
research and spend much of their time seemingly spinning their wheels. 
Thus, there are pros and cons to staying or leaving, but either decision will 
inevitably result in delayed or stalled projects. On the plus side, having 
worked in the IC can lend a degree of credibility and value added that 
cannot be achieved with an outsider perspective, which may offset some of 
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the costs of conducting research. There is an argument to be made that the 
benefits outweigh the costs, but to the extent possible, academics should 
plan and prepare for these substantial costs when developing their research 
agendas.
Conclusion
I have focused primarily on the challenges and opportunities presented
to individual scholars - what I’ve termed “boundary personnel” - as they 
navigate dual identities as intelligence practitioners and scholars. But it is 
crucial to remember that this negotiation is taking place in the context of 
macro-level approaches to notions of secrecy and openness that are 
constantly shifting in response to and/or in anticipation of geopolitical 
realities. In the 21st century - and especially post-9/11 - the government 
has publicized efforts to declassify more material (McDermott 2011), and the
official rhetoric has shifted towards the value of increased information 
sharing and collaboration among the intelligence agencies, from a “need to 
know” to a “need to share” posture.3 At the same time, researchers have 
seen a contradiction emerge: They argue that this same period has resulted 
in more classification and restricted access to information from the outside 
(Ellington 2011; Masco 2010) in what they term the “securocrats’ revenge” 
(Aftergood and Blanton 1999, 457) and the “iron curtain of secrecy” (Ericson
3 This terminology is problematic as it potentially reads as a false dichotomy: Information 
must always be shared with those with a genuine need to know, although the point of the
underlying sentiment is taken.
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2005). These constantly shifting dynamics mean that there can never be a 
standard approach to this work; scholars must contend with the sense that 
the sand is always shifting beneath their feet.
Rindzeviciute (2015) has suggested that massive government 
disclosures can go too far the other way and cause unanticipated harm, such
that a “sweet spot” between full secrecy and full transparency may be 
desirable, if it even makes sense to think in these terms. But it is not in the 
government’s best interest to limit inquiries too much either, because 
transparency and accountability are essential elements of a democracy. 
Similarly, it is unwise for boundary personnel to back away entirely and 
become discouraged by these many challenges. Social scientists - especially 
those who study organizations and bureaucracies more generally - have an 
intellectual obligation to engage with the intelligence community and other 
security institutions, so that we may better understand how these complex 
seats of power operate. The value added of having practitioners do this work
is that their tacit knowledge provides nuance and complexity to a body of 
scholarship that would otherwise suffer from their absence.
References
Aftergood, Steven. 1999.“Governmental Secrecy and Knowledge 
Production: A Survey of Some General Issues.” In Secrecy and 
Knowledge Production. Occasional Paper No. 23, edited by Judith 
26
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 5
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/5
Reppy, 17-29. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Peace Studies Program. 
http://large.stanford.edu/publications/crime/references/dennis/occasion
al-paper23.pdf
Aftergood, Steven, and Tom Blanton. 2009 [1999]. “The Securocrats’ 
Revenge.” In Government Secrecy: Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, edited by Susan Maret and Jan Goldman, 457-59. Westport, 
CT: Libraries Unlimited.
American Anthropological Association. 2007. Commission on the 
Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security and Intelligence 
Communities. Final Report, November 4. 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/20640
American Sociological Association. 1999. “Code of Ethics of the ASA 




Berling, Trine Villumsen, and Christian Bueger. 2013. “Practical Reflexivity
and Political Science: Strategies for Relating Scholarship and Political 
Practice.” Political Science and Politics 46, no. 1: 115-19.
Bowker, Geoffrey, and Susan Leigh Starr. 1999. Sorting Things Out: 
Classification and its Consequences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bussolini, Jeffrey. 2011. “Los Alamos as Laboratory for Domestic Security 
Measures: Nuclear Age Battlefield Transformations and the Ongoing 
Permutations of Security.” Geopolitics 16: 329-58.
Central Intelligence Agency. 2017. “Keeping Secrets Safe: The 
Publications Review Board.” February 2. https://www.cia.gov/about-
cia/publications-review-board
Crumpton, Henry A. 2013. The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in 
the CIA’s Clandestine Service. New York: Penguin Books.
27
Nolan: Ethnographic Research in the U.S. Intelligence Community
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
Dempsey, James X. 1998. “The CIA and Secrecy.” In A Culture of 
Secrecy: The Government Versus the People’s Right to Know, edited by 
Athan G. Theoharis, 37-59. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas.
Dennis, Michael Aaron. 1999. “Secrecy and Science Revisited: From 
Politics to Historical Practice and Back.” In Secrecy and Knowledge 
Production. Occasional Paper No. 23, edited by Judith Reppy, 1-16. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Peace Studies Program. 
http://large.stanford.edu/publications/crime/references/dennis/occasion
al-paper23.pdf
Durkheim, Emile. 1995 [1912]. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 
Trans. Karen E. Fields. New York: Free Press.
Ellington, Thomas C. 2011. “Secrecy and Disclosure: Policies and 
Consequences in the American Experience.” In Research in Social 
Problems and Public Policy, Volume 19: Government Secrecy, edited by 
Susan Maret, 67-90. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group.
Ellsberg, Daniel. 2002. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon 
Papers. New York: Penguin.
Ericson, Timothy L. 2005. "Building Our Own" Iron Curtain": The 
Emergence of Secrecy in American Government." The American 
Archivist 68, no. 1: 18-52. 
http://americanarchivist.org/doi/pdf/10.17723/aarc.68.1.9m260j24417
7p553?code=same-site
Evans, Samuel A. W., and Walter D. Valdivia. 2012. “Export Controls and 
the Tensions Between Academic Freedom and National Security.” 
Minerva 50, no. 2: 169-90.
Gieryn, Thomas F. 1983. “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science
from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of 
Scientists.” American Sociological Review 48, no. 6: 781-95.
Gusterson, Hugh. 1996.  Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End 
of the Cold War. Berkeley: University of California Press.
28
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 5
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/5
___.  1999. “Secrecy, Authorship and Nuclear Weapons Scientists.” In 
Secrecy and Knowledge Production. Occasional Paper No. 23, edited by 




Hammersley, Martyn and Paul Atkinson. 1995. Ethnography: Principles in 
Practice. London: Routledge. 
Hasler, Susan.2010.  Intelligence: A Novel of the CIA. New York: Thomas 
Dunne.
Hayden, Michael. 2016.  Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the 
Age of Terror. New York: Penguin.
Johnston, Rob. 2005. Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community:
An Ethnographic Study. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency Center




Jones, Abigail. 2016. “Women of the CIA: The Hidden History of American 
Spycraft.” Newsweek, September 21. 
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/09/30/cia-women-national-security-
500312.html
Kusiak, Pauline. 2008. “Sociocultural Expertise and the Military: Beyond 
the Controversy.” Military Review November-December: 65-76.
Lowenthal, Mark M. 2015. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: CQ Press.
MacKenzie, Donald and Graham Spinardi. 1995. “Tacit Knowledge, 
Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons.” American 
Journal of Sociology 101, no. 1: 44-99.
29
Nolan: Ethnographic Research in the U.S. Intelligence Community
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
Masco, Joseph. 2006. The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in 
Post-Cold War New Mexico. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Masco, Joseph. 2010. “’Sensitive but Unclassified’: Secrecy and the 
Counterterrorist State.” Public Culture 22, no. 3: 433-63.
McDermott, Patrice. 2011. “Secrecy Reform or Secrecy Redux?: Access to 
Information in the Obama Administration.” In Research in Social 
Problems and Public Policy, Volume 19: Government Secrecy, edited by 
Susan Maret, 189-218. Bingley, UK: Emerald.
Nolan, Bridget. 2013. “Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United
States Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study of the National 
Counterterrorism Center.” Unpublished Dissertation.
Plame, Valerie. 2007. Fair Game. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Price, David. 2011. Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in the 
Service of the Militarized State. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
Rhodes, Richard. 1986. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon
& Schuster.
Rindzeviciute, Egle. 2015. “The Overflow of Secrets: The Disclosure of 
Soviet Repression in Museums as an Excess.” Current Anthropology 56, 
supplement 12: S276-S285.
Russell, Charles J., and Robert G. Webster. 2005. “The Genesis of a 
Pandemic Influenza Virus.” Cell 123, no. 3: 368-71.
Teller, Edward. 1993. “The Laboratory of the Atomic Age.” Los Alamos 
Science, 21: 32-37.
30
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 5
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/5
Vaughan, Diane. 1996.  The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky 
Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.
Vogel, Kathleen M., Brian Balmer, Sam Weiss Evans, Inga Kroener, Miwao 
Matsumoto, and Brian Rappert. 2017. “Knowledge and Security.” In The
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, edited by Ulrike Felt, 
Rayvon Fouche, Clark A. Miller, and Laurel Smith-Doerr, 973-1001. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wellerstein, Alex. 2008. “From Classified to Commonplace: The Trajectory
of the Hydrogen Bomb Secret.” Endeavour 32, no. 2: 47–52. 




Nolan: Ethnographic Research in the U.S. Intelligence Community
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
